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Abstract 
This research provides empirical evidence on the consequences of stabilization and 
financial liberalization in Sierra Leone for implicit seigniorage and financial repression 
revenues and exchange rate over-valuation subsidy. The paper provides a political 
explanation for their sub optimal combination prior to adjustment and shows that the 
adjustment measures have reduced all implicit finances and the scope for using them for 
political objectives. External financing has largely replaced domestic financing of the 
reduced budget deficits. 
Key words: implicit government finances, fiscal reform, financial liberalization, Sierra 
Leone. 
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1. Introduction 
Implicit government finances have played a major role in the Sierra Leone economy. 
Prior to the structural adjustment programme (SAP) initiated in 1989, government 
relied substantially on seigniorage and financial repression to finance large budget deficits, 
which peaked at 15% of GDP in 1986/87. Table 1 indicates that in the 1980s annual 
reserve money growth averaged 53%, while real interest rates of -26% afforded subsidized 
directed credit to the public sector averaging 85% of total credit. On the other hand, 
over-valuation of the leone with an average black market spread of 125% afforded an 
implicit subsidy to the private sector as a net purchaser of foreign currency from 
government. 
Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators 1970-1996 (period averages) 
Year Real Black Public Budget % Rate of Foreign GDP 
treasury market sector deficit annual inflation debt growth 
bill spread credit (% of change (%) (% GDP) (%) 
rate (%) (%) (% of GDP) in reserve 
total) money 
1970-79 -4.4 2 54 6 21 11 22* 1.9 
1980-89 -26 125 85 9 53 63 45 0.5 
1990-96 -8.0 9 85 5 46 54 94 -4.1 
' (1974-1979) 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999; African Development Indicators. 
The inflation stabilization and financial liberalization measures of SAP imply loss of 
revenues from seigniorage and financial repression along with the reduction or elimination 
of the implicit exchange rate over-valuation subsidy. This raises important policy 
questions. What have been the quantitative importance and overall implications of implicit 
government finances over the years in Sierra Leone? What has been driving these implicit 
government finances? 
This research assesses the implications of implicit government finances for the 
stabilization and financial liberalization reform measures introduced in Sierra Leone 
since 1989. To date, studies on implicit finances in developing countries have tended to 
focus on specific components, ignoring the complementarities. Pinto (1989) provides a 
framework for analysing the fiscal impact of liberalization in the context of exchange 
rate over-valuation when government is a net purchaser of foreign currency from the 
private sector, while Morris (1995) examines the net seller case. Adam et al. (1996) 
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assess the implications of liberalization for seigniorage revenue. Fischer (1982) 
estimates the seigniorage benefits forgone by using foreign money for a worldwide sample 
of countries. Chamley and Honohan (1990) present alternative measures of implicit and 
explicit taxation of the financial system and estimates for five African countries. 
Giovannini and de Melo (1993) present quantitative estimates of financial repression 
revenues for developing countries. This study adopts a more comprehensive approach 
by empirically estimating seigniorage and financial repression revenues and exchange 
rate over-valuation subsidy to assess the fiscal implications of the stabilization and 
financial liberalization measures of the adjustment programme of the early 1990s. 
Furthermore, the study provides a political explanation for the suboptimal levels of implicit 
finances prior to adjustment revealed by the estimates. 
Section 2 discusses the issues, in particular the interactions among the three components 
of implicit government finances and the expected consequences of financial liberalization, 
while Section 3 reviews the adjustment programme. This is followed by the methodology 
in Section 4 and empirical analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The issues 
Financial repression consists in restricting domestic interest rates and international capital flows to artificially lower the cost of government borrowing. Seigniorage, on 
the other hand, is the real revenue flow enjoyed by government as a result of the issue 
and subsequent taxation of its primary liabilities (Adam, 1995). Exchange rate over-
valuation occurs when the official exchange rate lies below the market clearing rate. 
In terms of complementarities, exchange rate over-valuation usually occurs in a fixed 
exchange rate regime as part of financial repression. Financial repression reduces the 
array of financial instruments, increasing the demand for narrow money—the seigniorage 
tax base. Also, financial repression through high reserve requirements increases the 
demand for high powered money whenever required reserves are in cash. The 
complementarity between financial repression and seigniorage breaks down at very high 
rates of inflation, however, which induces capital flight and currency substitution, 
decreasing domestic money demand. 
Turning to their determinants, seigniorage has two components: the growth in real 
money balances, and the inflation tax—the depreciation in real balances induced by 
inflation. The base for the inflation tax is real narrow money while the rate is the inflation 
rate. High inflation decreases the inflation tax base, which can give rise to a Laffer curve 
between seigniorage and inflation, implying the existence of an inflation rate that 
maximizes steady-state seigniorage. Revenues or taxes from over-valuation depend on 
its institutionally determined base—net sales or purchase of foreign currency from the 
private sector—and its subsidy or tax rate, the endogenous black market spread. Financial 
repression revenue depends on two institutionally determined variables: its tax rate—the 
difference between the domestic cost of borrowing and the shadow cost of funds—and 
its tax base, which is the stock of government debt outside the central bank. 
The raison d'etre for implicit finances in developing countries can be explained in the context of the following basic government budget constraint showing the sources of 
financing aggregate explicit and implicit government expenditures: 
Raison d'etre for implicit finances 
Explicit expenditures + 
implicit exchange rate 
over-valuation expenditures 
explicit revenues + 
implicit exchange rate 
over-valuation revenues + 
money financing + 
domestic debt financing + 
external debt financing (A) 
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Equation A shows that government can finance its aggregate expenditures from explicit 
revenues, exchange rate over-valuation, money financing, and domestic and external 
debt financing. In developing countries, however, a typically narrow tax base and high 
administration costs limit the scope for raising explicit tax revenues, the bulk of explicit 
revenues. Conventional budget deficits therefore tend to be high. External financing can 
be costly, if available. Money financing (seigniorage) and domestic debt financing under 
financial repression represent cheap means of financing the deficit to government. 
Moreover, these implicit finances are politically expedient in the short run because they 
are less visible. When government is a net purchaser of foreign currency from the private 
sector, exchange rate over-valuation yields net revenues, reducing the need for seigniorage 
and financial repression. Here, financial liberalization represents a negative fiscal shock 
to government, inducing recourse to inflationary seigniorage, unless fiscal reform is 
undertaken. When government is a net seller of foreign currency, over-valuation constitutes 
net expenditures, increasing the need for seigniorage and financial repression. Here, by 
reducing the need for inflationary seigniorage, liberalization would be beneficial for 
both resource allocation and macroeconomic stability. 
Equation A can therefore be rearranged to give an identity between what I will call 
the broad fiscal deficit—the conventional budget deficit (explicit expenditures minus 
explicit revenues) and net expenditure from exchange rate over-valuation (implicit 
exchange rate over-valuation expenditures minus revenues)—and its financing: 
Conventional budget deficit = money financing + 
+ net exchange rate domestic debt financing + 
over-valuation expenditure external debt financing (B) 
Equation B shows that the larger the broad fiscal deficit, the greater the need for any 
or a combination of the three sources of its financing: money, domestic debt or external 
debt financing. 
Optimal taxation 
Standard principles of taxation suggest that government would seek to raise revenue from explicit and implicit sources in such a way as to minimize their distortions. 
Specifically, the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy advocated by Barro (1979, 1985) 
argues that actual tax and deficit policies are a reflection of a long-term inter-temporal 
optimization by government, which chooses policies to minimize the excess burden of 
taxation for a given path of government expenditure. The tax smoothing hypothesis implies 
that the socially optimum policy for Sierra Leone, where government has been a net 
seller of foreign currency, is to minimize the exchange rate over-valuation subsidy, 
allowing minimization of taxes—explicit and implicit. 
Empirical support for this "tax smoothing hypothesis" has been limited, however, as 
it does not take account of critical political and institutional factors that can render 
government policy time inconsistent unless government can commit its future actions 
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(Kyland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983a/b), These factors, variously 
highlighted by Alesina (1986), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Roubini and Sachs (1988), 
Kyland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a/b), and Andrabi (1997), include 
political conflict in budgetary policy, the tenure of government and coalitions. 
The impact of liberalization 
While financial liberalization seeks to eliminate or reduce all three implicit government finances, it is seigniorage revenue that responds to it behaviourally 
since financial repression revenue and exchange rate over-valuation subsidy are largely 
institutionally determined. The impact of liberalization on seigniorage revenues depends 
on conditions at the outset of reform, the impact of the reform measures on growth, and 
the private sector's demand for money as well as its expectations concerning the success 
of the reform measures. Liberalization tends to increase access to and the expected rate 
of return on foreign currency, and the liquidity of non-monetary assets, increasing the 
inflation elasticity of money demand. This tends to reduce money demand, as do 
uncertainty about the timing and success of the reform, high inflation, and high money 
stock or binding exchange control at the outset of reform. So also does liberalization in 
the real economy, which reduces the shortage of goods and hence the speculative balances 
held by the private sector in anticipation of short spells of goods availability. A decrease 
in money demand shifts the seigniorage Laffer curve inwards, reducing the seigniorage 
maximizing rate of inflation. Seigniorage revenue decreases, inducing accelerating 
inflation unless fiscal adjustment is undertaken, since a higher inflation tax is needed to 
finance a given budget deficit. Currency substitution also induces volatile inflation. On 
the other hand, low money demand or widespread evasion of exchange control at the 
outset of reform, favourable expectations about the outcome of the reform, and income 
growth after reform all tend to increase domestic money demand, allowing inflation 
reduction at a low cost in terms of fiscal contraction. 
Measurement issues 
Seigniorage 
There are different conceptual approaches to measuring seigniorage, each with different 
implications. The principal approaches involve taking the real money base—always 
including currency and sometimes also bank reserves—and multiplying it by either (a) 
the rate of growth in money (the cash flow measure); (b) the rate of inflation (the inflation 
tax measure); or (c) the nominal interest rate (the interest measure). In steady state with 
zero real interest rate, all three measures are the same. In practice, however, the assumption 
of a steady state is almost always irrelevant (Chamley, 1991). To the extent that they are 
different in practice, they can be used to explore different aspects of the currency tax 
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(Honohan, 1996). The cash flow measure of seigniorage—the one relevant to this study— 
measures the degree to which the government's deficit is being financed. It is given by: 
where M is nominal money balances and % is the rate of inflation. 
In a discrete time period the opportunity cost of holding money is given by the rate of 
inflation over one plus the rate of inflation, and the relevant formula for seigniorage 
becomes: 
The foregoing cash flow measure of seigniorage comprises two components: the 
inflation tax, Jimt_p and the growth in real money balances, m, - m r 
Financial repression revenue 
Financial repression revenue (FRR) has not been frequently estimated in the literature. 
Giovannini and de Melo (1993) estimate it directly as the difference between the ex post 
shadow and domestic cost of funds times the stock of government debt held outside the 
central bank. The shadow cost of funds is proxied by the sum of the estimated dollar 
interest rate on external debt and the realized depreciation of the domestic currency 
relative to the dollar. The principal weakness of this measure, which precludes its use in 
this study, is that it overstates FRR in years of sharp exchange rate depreciations, common 
in Sierra Leone prior to adjustment. 
Chamley and Honohan (1990) offer alternative methods of measuring FRR based on 
estimating the market clearing rate of interest on short-term risk-free paper, r*. Measure 
one arbitrarily assumes r* to be 1% higher than the expected rate of inflation. Measure 
two involves taking interest rates during periods of comparative absence of interest rate 
controls as market clearing rates. The jump in interest rates at the beginning of such 
periods is taken as a measure of the gap between actual and market clearing rates for 
other periods. This measure is weakened by the assumption that the degree of financial 
repression was constant outside periods identified as liberal. Measure three takes the 
actual foreign interest rate adjusted for actual exchange rate change as a measure of /•*, 
while measure four differs only by using the parallel market exchange rate instead of the 
official one. These last two measures share the same weaknesses as Giovannini and de 
Melo's method of overstating FRR in years of sharp exchange rate depreciations. Measure 
five takes the growth in base money as a rough indicator of expected inflation and assumes 
that r* is 1% higher. Data constraints and the weaknesses of these methods preclude 
their use in this study. 
St = AM, / Pt= Ktmt_x + {m, - (1) 
S, = AM, IP, = k, / ( ! + + {m, - m,_x} (2) 
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Exchange rate over-valuation subsidy 
Exchange rate over-valuation subsidy has also not been frequently estimated empirically 
in the literature, partly because of the lack of data relating to net purchases or sales of 
foreign currency to the private sector. However, Morris (1995) presents a stylized account 
of the budget, monetary accounts and balance of payments of Uganda that can serve as a 
basis for estimating net government sales or purchases of foreign currency. 
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3. The adjustment programme 
Despite its abundant mineral wealth—diamonds, rutile, bauxite, gold—and rich agricultural and marine resources, Sierra Leone's economic performance has been 
one of long-term decline. Average annual GDP growth of 4% in the 1960s, the first 
decade of independence, slowed to 1.9% in the 1970s and further to 0.5% in the 1980s, 
before turning negative in the 1990s. 
The economic decline emanated in part from the oil price shocks of the 1970s, which 
led to unsustainable current account deficits and higher inflation, with budget deficits 
increasing from less than 3% of GDP prior to 1973 to over 9% subsequently. Government 
responded with administrative and physical control measures, increased domestic—mainly 
central bank—and foreign borrowing, and financial repression. It subsidized basic imports 
of rice and fuel to cushion the price increases and also provided foreign currency for 
imports at over-valued official exchange rates. This encouraged smuggling of imported 
goods to neighbouring countries for higher prices, increasing the fiscal burden of the 
subsidies and exacerbating the balance of payments difficulties. Exchange control 
measures were introduced and in desperation the exchange rate was pegged variously to 
the pound sterling, the dollar and the Special Drawing Rights, in addition to a dual 
exchange rate system. 
These exchange rate management measures fostered a foreign exchange crisis. Official 
imports and domestic industrial production fell sharply, reducing real revenues from 
import and excise duties, which accounted for about 70% of tax revenues in the early 
1980s. Consequently, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP slipped from 15% in 1981 to less 
than 8% between 1983 and 1990. A thriving black market for foreign currency encouraged 
smuggling of primary exports, reducing the export tax base and increasing current account 
deficits. Also, falling export prices and lavish expenditures of over 65% of government 
revenues on a flamboyant Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in 1980 
aggravated the fiscal and current account deficits and overall economic decline. The 
debt crisis emerged, with the domestic debt to GDP ratio increasing from 9% in 1974 to 
a peak of 47% in 1983, while the ratio for external debt increased from 15% in 1980 to 
91% in 1990, pushing the ratio of total debt to GDP from 24% in 1980 to 102% in 1990. 
The economic crisis led to an adjustment programme in June 1986 that was terminated 
in October 1987 because Sierra Leone was unable to meet certain macroeconomic targets. 
The present adjustment programme started in November 1989 with a two-year trial 
"shadow" programme with no programme financial support. In April 1990, the exchange 
rate was liberalized. Foreign exchange bureaus began operating in 1992 and commercial 
banks' interest rates were deregulated. Directed credit to the public sector was discontinued 
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and a treasury bill auction was introduced as the main vehicle for open market 
operations, with a unified bank and non-bank market for treasury bills. Government 
sought to address the external debt crisis by rescheduling official debts, clearing debt 
arrears and launching a commercial debt buy-back operation. Government has also 
privatized all imports, though it still provides some of the requisite foreign currency 
mainly through loans obtained from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
Financial liberalization has not led to increased financial deepening and competition 
in the financial sector, however. The M2/GDP ratio actually declined from 23% in the 
1980s to 13% in the 1990s. Though real lending rates have been positive but highly 
variable since 1993, real deposit rates have remained negative except for 1993. Domestic 
credit to government was 85% in the 1990s, the same as in the 1980s. The blame for 
these disappointing results lies partly with the ongoing rebel war since 1991 that has 
forced large increases in defence expenditures, mitigating attempts at curtailing overall 
government expenditures and reducing real government revenues as economic activity 
declined. Nevertheless, inflation declined from 111% in 1990 to 23% in 1996 as budget 
deficits decreased from 15% of GDP in 1986/87 to under 8% since 1993 owing to the 
removal of subsidies on rice and petroleum products and to state enterprises, reduction 
in the public sector work force by a third, and curtailment of duty waivers. 
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4. Estimation 
The study estimates empirically three sources of implicit finance: seigniorage revenue, financial repression revenue and the exchange rate over-valuation subsidy. Data on 
the calculation of all three implicit finances were obtained from various issues of IMF's 
International Financial Statistics and Bank of Sierra Leone's BSL Bulletin. Because of 
the unavailability of data, the exchange rate over-valuation subsidy is estimated only for 
the period 1982-1994. 
Seigniorage revenue 
eigniorage revenue S ( is calculated as: 
S, = {n, /(I + n,) }m,_, + {m, - m,_,} (3) 
where 71 s = inflation rate at time t 
m t = real (reserve) money supply 
The two components of seigniorage revenue—inflation tax and real money growth— 
are given respectively, by the two terms on the right-hand side of Equation 3. 
Financial repression revenue 
Financial repression revenue (FRR) is calculated as the difference between the ex post foreign (shadow) cost of funds, and the domestic cost of funds, times the 
domestic stock of government debt held outside the central bank: 
FRR, = { r f , - r'l,}GDl (4) 
Because of data constraints, the shadow cost of funds is calculated as the US real 
prime lending rate and the domestic cost of funds is given by the real interest rates on 
treasury bills, the main instrument of government domestic borrowing prior to adjustment. 
It is assumed that exchange rate depreciations feed through domestic inflation and hence 
affect domestic commercial banks' real interest rates. 
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Exchange rate over-valuation subsidy 
et foreign currency sold to the private sector (NFC p s) is obtained from the following 
stylized version of the government balance of payments account: 
AR = DPpst - FRa, - GPat - FCps, (5) 
where: 
AR ~ change in foreign reserves 
DP p s = foreign currency purchased by government from the private sector 
FR a = foreign currency received from abroad 
GP a = government payments abroad (debt, etc.) 
FC p s = foreign currency sold to the private sector 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation 5 give the sources of foreign 
currency to government, while the last two terms give the uses of foreign currency. Net 
foreign currency sold to the private sector (NFC p s), given by the difference between 
government sales and purchases of foreign currency from the private sector: 
NFCps, = FCps, - DPpst (6) 
is obtained as the residual in Equation 5 above, thus: 
NFC1", = FR", - GPa, - AR O) 
A positive NFC p s implies government is a net seller and a negative NFC p s implies 
government is a net buyer. Noting that an increase in reserves is recorded as a negative 
AR and a decrease in reserves is recorded as positive AR in the IMF's Balance of Payments 
Yearbook, NFC p s is given by the difference between the sum of all government credit 
items on the balance of payments, and the sum of all government debit items in the 
Yearbook. The Appendix to this report provides the data used to estimate NFC p s . 
The exchange rate over-valuation subsidy (EROS) is given by the product of the 
difference between the black and official market exchange rate (black market differential), 
BMD, and NFC p s . 
EROS = BMD x NFC"S (8) 
A positive EROS implies a subsidy and a negative implies a tax. 
5. Empirical analysis 
Estimates of implicit government finances (complemented by explicit finances) are presented in Table 2. They are all given as percentages of GDP over the period 
1970-1996 (except for the exchange rate over-valuation subsidy, which is for 1982-
1994). 
The stylized findings 
r J ^ a b l e 2 reveals the following stylized findings: 
Table 2: Implicit and explicit finances (% GDP) 1970-1996 
Year Inflation Inflation Real Seigniorage Financial Total Exchange Net Explicit Change 
rate (%) tax money repression implicit rate implicit revenues in 
growth tax over- finance (taxes foreign 
valuation and debt/ 
subsidy grants) GDP% 
ratio 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(1+2) (2+3) (4+5) (6-7) 
1970 8 1.3 -2.6 -1.3 0.1 -1.2 
1971 -2 -0.3 1.6 1.3 -0.2 1.1 15.5 
1972 4 0.6 1.3 1.9 0.0 1.9 16.9 
1973 10 1.6 2.4 3.9 0.2 4.2 16.3 
1974 14 2.3 -0.4 1.9 0.4 2.3 19.2 
1975 20 3.0 -1.5 1.5 0.8 2.3 17.0 5.7 
1976 17 2.4 -0.1 2.4 1.0 3.4 15.5 1.6 
1977 11 1.7 0.7 2.4 0.6 3.0 16.0 -1.6 
1978 8 1.2 8.8 10.1 0.3 10.4 19.9 6.4 
1979 19 3.9 7.0 10.9 0.9 11.8 18.8 1.2 
1980 12 3.3 -5.4 -2.1 0.3 -1.8 17.1 3.5 
1981 23 , 4.5 -4.3 0.1 0.9 1.0 18.3 -1.0 
1982 28 4.1 9.2 13.3 0.9 14.2 19.9 -5.7 11.9 -0.4 
1983 68 11.6 -7.3 4.3 3.5 7.8 14.9 -7.0 9.1 -2.6 
1984 66 8.4 -3.1 5.3 2.3 7.6 14.1 -6.5 9.7 4.3 
1985 77 8.1 -2.5 5.6 3.4 9.0 10.7 -1.7 7.5 13.8 
cont. 
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Year Inflation Inflation Real Seigniorage Financial Total Exchange Net Explicit Change 
rate (%) tax money repression implicit rate implicit revenues in 
growth tax over- finance (taxes foreign 
valuation and debt/ 
subsidy grants) GDP% 
ratio 
1986 81 7.3 2.3 9.6 0.8 10.4 -8.8 19.2 7.5 17.2 
1987 179 11.4 -7.0 4.4 4.1 8.4 2.5 6.0 9.4 13.4 
1988 34 2.9 3.8 6.7 1.5 8.2 4.6 3.6 7.7 -25.5 
1989 61 5.7 1.3 7.0 2.8 9.8 0.78 9.0 7.6 8.0 
1990 111 8.6 -3.5 5.1 3.1 8.2 0.65 7.6 6.1 32.3 
1991 103 6.7 -2.6 4.2 1.1 5.3 0.84 4.4 10.6 -9.9 
1992 66 4.9 -3.5 1.4 -0.1 1.3 0.04 1.3 12.4 31.2 
1993 22 1.7 -1.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.05 0.2 13.2 -24.9 
1994 24 1.6 0.1 1.6 0.4 2.1 0.04 2.0 14.4 -5.6 
1995 26 1.7 -0.9 0.8 0.5 1.3 9.5 10.5 
1996 23 1.3 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 8.9 17.5 
Averages 
1970--96 3.9 1.1 5.0 4.7a 2.3a 12.9b 
1970--88 4.3 1.1 5.5 8.3C 1.1° 14.1d 
1993--96 1.0 0.23 1.25 0.04® 1.2s 11.5 
a: 1982-94 b: 1971-96 
c: 1982-88 d: 1971-88 
e: 1992-94 
Seigniorage revenues 
Average seigniorage revenue of 3.9% of GDP was large but volatile over 1970-1996. 
Seigniorage was relatively low between 1970 and 1977 (1.8%), peaked over the period 
1978 and 1979 (10.1% and 10.9%, respectively) and 1982 (13.3%), and tended to fall 
thereafter. During the reform period, seigniorage revenue decreased substantially, 
averaging 0.9% for 1993-1996 compared to 6.9% for 1986-1989. 
In the meantime, average inflation tax revenue of 4.14% has been higher than average 
seigniorage revenue of 3.9%, while average real money growth revenue has been negative 
(-0.3%). 
Financial repression revenues 
Financial repression revenue for 1970-1996 has been low but volatile over the years. It 
was relatively low in 1970-1973 at an average of 0.03% of GDP, peaked at 4.1 % in 1987 
and declined to 0.23% in 1993-1996. The overall average was 1.1% per year. 
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Exchange rate over-valuation subsidy 
The exchange rate over-valuation subsidy was substantial between 1982 and 1985, 
averaging 15%, but fell dramatically to 0.04% in 1992-1994. 
Aggregate implicit government finances 
Net implicit finance (implicit taxes less exchange rate over-valuation subsidy) was 
negative between 1982 and 1985, averaging -5.2% of GDP because of the preponderance 
of the exchange rate over-valuation subsidy. Since 1986, net implicit finance has been 
positive as seigniorage and financial repression revenues have outweighed the exchange 
rate over-valuation subsidy. Net implicit finance has fallen to 2% or less since 1992 as 
all three components have decreased substantially. Refer to figures 1 -5 for illustrations 
of the tracking of the components. 
Sierra Leone's average annual seigniorage revenue of 3.9% of GDP is high relative to 
other African countries. Fischer's (1982) estimates average 1.3% for African countries, 
while Adam et al. (1996) obtain estimates of less than 0.4% of GDP for Kenya and 
Tanzania and 0% of GDP for Ghana for 1971-1993. Sierra Leone's average annual 
financial repression revenue of 1.1% of GDP falls within the range of 0 -5% of GDP 
reported by Giovannini and de Melo (1993) for a group of 24 developing countries. 
However, the different methods of estimating financial repression revenues in these two 
studies limit the scope for comparison. 
Analysis of the stylized findings 
The basic insight from the evidence presented in Table 2 is that prior to liberalization government pursued a short-sighted, non-welfare maximizing fiscal policy. It 
borrowed heavily from abroad and raised high levels of distortionary seigniorage and 
financial repression revenues from the private sector. Concurrently, these financed a 
similarly distortionary implicit subsidy to the private sector through sales of foreign 
currency at artificially low official exchange rates. A more prudent policy regime could 
have increased social welfare by reducing taxes, subsidies and foreign borrowing. 
Why did government adopt this non-welfare maximizing fiscal stance prior to reform 
and what have been the consequences of liberalization? These questions prompt another 
question: Who benefited from this fiscal stance and who were the losers? 
The politics of fiscal behaviour 
I advance three political explanations for government 's fiscal behaviour prior to 
liberalization. First is fear of urban protest. The unpopular All People's Congress (APC) 
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Figure 1: Implicit finances (% GDP), 1970-1996 
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Figure 2: Explicit revenues, implicit taxes and sum (% GDP), 1971-1996 
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Figure 3: Net Implicit finance and explicit revenues (% GDP), 1982-1994 
Figure 4: Sum: Explicit revenues, Implicit taxes and change in foreign debt/GDP ratio 
(% GDP), 1975-1996 
Year 
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Figure 5: Sum: Explicit revenues, net implicit finance and change in foreign debt/GDP ratio 
(% GDP), 1982-1994 
in power from 1968 to 1992, fearful of the reaction from the politically volatile urban 
population to a full pass-through of the oil price shocks of the 1970s, subsidized basic 
rice and fuel imports—which are mainly consumed by the urban population. At the same 
time, it provided foreign currency for imports at over-valued official exchange rates and 
imposed price control and rationing of scarce foreign currency and basic imports. Despite 
leading to unsustainable current account and budget deficits, these explicit and implicit 
subsidies, once implemented, became politically difficult to remove. Instead, the current 
account and budget deficits were financed by a mix of seigniorage, financial repression, 
foreign borrowing and implicit taxation of export agriculture through exchange rate over-
valuation. 
However, the urban fears perspective does not explain why, even within the urban 
population, there was an elite who benefited more. This leads to the second explanation. 
The APC deliberately used the economic distortions for political control and to retain 
power, institutionalizing a patron-client relationship based on loyalty to the party in 
exchange for access to the rents from the distortions. The losers were those outside the 
elite who were unable to access the rent created by the economic distortions or substitute 
away from domestic money to avoid the inflation tax. Rural farmers belonged to this 
outsider group. They were further penalized through rice subsidies that depressed local 
prices. Furthermore, exchange rate over-valuation and explicit export taxation penalized 
export farmers from the strongly anti-APC eastern and southern regions. 
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How did private agents respond to these distortions and what were the consequences? 
Financial repression fostered an informal financial system, especially in the rural areas, 
which disproportionately bore the brunt of the distortionary implicit finances. Exchange 
rate over-valuation induced black markets for foreign currency and smuggling of imports 
and primary exports of diamonds, gold, cocoa and coffee to neighbouring countries or 
overseas for higher prices.This exacerbated the fiscal and balance of payments 
difficulties,and lowered the capacity to import and service the external debt as it increased 
reliance on implicit taxes. By the mid 1980s much of the economy was underground. 
Basic imports of rice and fuel were permanently scarce, leading to burgeoning black 
markets. The black market for foreign currency offered some scope for currency 
substitution, providing an effective way of avoiding the inflation tax on domestic money, 
reducing seigniorage revenues and necessitating higher inflation rates to finance a given 
fiscal deficit through seigniorage. Inflation soared, peaking at 170% in 1987. As the 
black market intensified, exchange control measures and various exchange rate regimes 
were introduced to no avail. Furthermore, implicit taxation of agriculture forced the 
rural population into deeper subsistence. 
Figure 6, plotting inflation against seigniorage, further exposes government's short-
sightedness. Money creation generated large seigniorage of 6% in 1978-1991, but also 
high inflation of 62% in 1983-1991. In 1993-1996, however, seigniorage was 1%, only 
roughly half its value of 2.1% for 1971-1975, while inflation was 24%, more than double 
its 1971-1975 value. This suggests some hysteresis on the part of the private sector in 
reacting to the high inflation of the 1980s by permanent reductions in money demand by 
the 1990s—implying a reduction in seigniorage potential. The liberalization measures 
increased opportunities, and the rebel war provided the impetus, for substitution out of 
domestic money. 
The third explanation for government fiscal behaviour prior to reform focuses on 
why government was short-sighted. I argue that unable or unwilling to discipline itself 
fiscally, government used short-sighted policies to palliate present economic difficulties, 
passing on many of the adverse consequences to future generations and governments. 
This view clearly contradicts the tax-smoothing hypothesis that perceives tax policy as a 
reflection of an inter-temporal optimization by government. In Sierra Leone, as the 
economic crisis deepened in the 1980s, partly induced by distortionary implicit finances, 
government failed to reduce its expenditures to allow the unsustainable budget deficits 
and foreign borrowing to decrease, as would be expected of an inter-temporally optimizing 
government. Instead, the withering state desperately resorted increasingly to the very 
measures an inter-temporally optimizing government would have avoided to finance its 
inordinate expenditures: inflationary seigniorage and unsustainable foreign borrowing 
including defaulting on debt servicing obligations. From the standpoint of the APC 
government, however, short-sightedness was rational; given its finite life span—in contrast 
with the naive assumption of an infinitely lived government in orthodox economic 
theory—the APC would not have to bear the adverse consequences. It passed them on to 
future generations and governments. 
The government's non-welfare maximizing and short-sighted fiscal behaviour 
highlights the absence of domestic agencies of restraint on government—mechanisms 
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Figure 6: Seigniorage (% GDP) and inflation (%), 1970-1996 
designed to restrain the power of government such as an independent central bank— 
in Sierra Leone. Prior to reform, individual ministries had wide scope to spend, which 
they abused widely. Seigniorage was used as the residual means of financing the deficit 
with an often compliant central bank leveraged by the power of the head of state to 
appoint or dismiss the governor. Moreover, the prospect of physical violence and death 
always loomed over the governor. In 1979, the then governor was murdered after raising 
objections about inordinate expenditures related to the hosting of the 1980 Organization 
of African Unity summit whose cost represented 65% of government revenues for that 
year. 
Reform or collapse 
Given such perspectives explaining government fiscal behaviour, why did government 
reform? The crisis that preceded the reform, partly induced by distortionary implicit 
finances, collapse of infrastructure and basic utilities like electricity and water supply 
even in Freetown, the national capital, a burgeoning underground economy that shrank 
the tax base, high inflation, declining GDP growth, increased poverty, and declining aid 
flows, impelled government to reform for its own survival, to avert the impending collapse 
of the state. Inevitably, the government turned to the international financial institutions, 
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swallowing their self-disciplining policy prescriptions. The subsequent reform measures 
were accompanied by adjustment credit, which improved the supply of scarce essential 
imports and infrastructure, largely benefiting urban consumers. The ascension of a military 
government in 1992 facilitated the adoption of some of the stringent reform measures. 
Fiscal reform and exchange rate liberalization have altered the political economy 
balance induced by distortionary implicit government finances. Decreased exchange rate 
over-valuation subsidies, reduced budget deficits and reduction in domestic financing of 
deficits—from 70-100% in the 1980s to 2-50% since 1991—in favour of external 
financing have allowed a reduction in seigniorage and financial repression. Liberalization 
has, moreover, de-politicized commodity, foreign currency and credit markets, removing 
the direct and implicit subsidies enjoyed by the urban population and eliminating or 
reducing the rents enjoyed by the elite. Furthermore, economic management has shifted 
towards technocrats somewhat buffered from political influence. 
The financing of the deficit 
With liberalization reducing implicit government revenues, deficit financing has shifted 
from seigniorage and financial repression to explicit debt issue and foreign borrowing. 
Domestic financing of deficits decreased from 77% in 1987-1989 to 15% in 1993-1997. 
Reduced budget deficits have lessened the need for deficit financing, however. It is 
important to investigate the consequences of these alternative means of financing the 
deficit in order to determine the implications for the economy. 
6. Conclusions 
This study has provided empirical evidence indicating that the stabilization and liberalization measures of structural adjustment in Sierra Leone have reduced all 
components of implicit government finances—seigniorage and financial repression 
revenues and exchange rate over-valuation subsidy. The study has provided a political 
explanation for the non-welfare maximizing government fiscal behaviour prior to reform, 
as revealed by the estimates. It may be concluded that by reducing budget deficits and 
hence the need for distortionary implicit finances, the reform measures promote both 
macroeconomic stability and economic efficiency. The enduring lesson from the study is 
the importance of agencies of restraint to keep the fiscal behaviour of government in 
check, such as an independent central bank, delegation of economic management to 
technocrats buffered from political influences, or monetary unions such as the CFAZone 
in francophone Africa. Zambia and Uganda have tried the restrictive cash budget: 
government spends only what it received the previous day in Zambia or the previous 
month in Uganda, while Indonesia achieved great success with the balanced budget rule 
in its constitution. 
An important area of research to complement the findings of this study is the 
implications of the alternative methods of financing budget deficits—explicit debt issue 
and foreign borrowing—adopted by government during the reform period. Has greater 
reliance on explicit debt issue raised real interest rates? What are the implications of 
external borrowing for the balance of payments, the real exchange rate and other key 
macroeconomic variables? These are topics for future studies. 
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Appendix: Estimation of exchange rate over-
valuation subsidy (EROS) 
Table A1: Final calculation 


































1982 98.1 1.24 4.5 3.26 319.81 1,605 19.93 
1983 61.8 1.89 6.4 4.51 278.72 1,876 14.86 
1984 78.9 2.51 7.38 4.87 384.24 2,730 14.07 
1985 45.7 5.09 15.25 10.16 464.31 4,365 10.64 
1986 -63 16.09 27.08 10.99 -692.37 7,888 -8.78 
1987 35.4 34.04 49.58 15.54 550.12 22,472 2.45 
1988 100.3 32.51 48.2 15.66 1,570.70 34,305 4.58 
1989 10.3 59.81 102.3 42.44 437.13 55,804 0.78 
1990 21.2 151.45 180.8 29.38 622.86 96,133 0.65 
1991 30.8 295.34 347.6 52.26 1,609.61 192,428 0.84 
1992 3.7 499.44 535.3 35.81 132.50 327,259 0.04 
1993 94.9 567.46 590.3 22.85 2,168.46 467,188 0.46 
1994 82.5 586.74 589.4 2.64 217.80 543,711 0.04 
Table A2: Sources and uses of foreign currency for government 1988-1994 (million US$) 
Year Government Government Current Current Fund Long-term Short-term Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities Reserve Net foreign 
services n.i.e. services n.i.e. transfers transfers credit & loans loans monetary monetary gen. govt gen. govt assets currency 
(credit) (debit) gen. govt gen. govt loans gen. govt gen. govt authorities authorities long-term short-term sold to the 
(credit) (debit) long-term short-term private sector 
NFC»S 
1988 33.9 -2.0 8.80 -3.00 -1.00 13.30 -5.10 -26.50 87.40 -20.8 22 -6.7 100.3 
1989 22.4 -2.3 7.50 -3.00 -1.60 -17.80 -7.90 -11.60 39.70 -25.6 1.2 9.3 10.3 
1990 15.9 -7.3 7.00 -2.00 -4.50 8.50 1.30 -13.00 55.20 -43.0 8.2 -5.1 21.2 
1991 16.9 -1.2 7.30 -1.00 -7.50 -4.40 -3.60 -6.10 31.60 -20.9 30.4 -10.7 30.8 
1992 11.2 -4.0 4.10 -8.00 -5.20 -4.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3 26.9 -14 3.7 
1993 13.6 -1.0 16.00 -1.70 -8.40 47.50 -3.30 0.00 44.50 -25.1 26.4 -13.6 94.9 
1994 14.2 -14.2 46.30 -8.00 55.10 40.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 -71.2 38.3 -18.6 82.5 




































































1982 -9.1 3.1 -9.2 45.5 -2.2 1.9 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 19.9 39.5 8.4 98.1 
1983 -10 9.7 -2 33.2 -1.2 1.5 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -51.8 76.3 6.1 61.8 
1984 -14.1 11.7 -1.9 24.5 -0.6 1.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 -56 94.8 19 78.8 
1985 -11.8 6 -3.4 16 -0.2 0.9 -0.1 1 -0.6 -43.9 86.5 -4.8 45.6 
1986 -2.7 6.2 -2.1 3.8 -0.1 0.7 0 0.4 -0.1 -168.1 123.8 -24.8 -63 
1987 -14.7 15.4 -3.9 6.2 -0.2 0.6 0 0.2 -0.1 2.7 31.6 -2.4 35.4 
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